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The largest entitlement program in the United States today is the social security 
program.  Social security benefits payments in  1993 amounted to $267.8 bil- 
lion, which is over 18 percent of the federal budget and over 4 percent of U.S. 
GDP in that year; this represents a doubling as share of GDP in the past thirty 
years. Social security in the United States is also a system in fiscal imbalance. 
The convergence of  three trends in the early twenty-first  century will cause 
problems with the long-run solvency of the program. Two of these trends are 
the aging of the “baby-boom’’ cohort and the drop in the fertility rate of U.S. 
families. As a result, the  ratio of persons  over age sixty-five to those aged 
twenty to sixty-four has risen from 0.14 in 1950 to 0.21 today and is projected 
to rise to 0.36 by 2030 and to 0.41 by 2070. The final trend is the reduction in 
the rate of growth in real wages in the United States, which has lowered the 
base  of  earnings on  which  social security  benefits  commitments  can be  fi- 
nanced. As a result, current estimates imply that, if the structure of the program 
remains  unchanged, payroll taxes to finance this program, currently at  12.4 
percent of payroll, would have to rise to over 18 percent (Steuerle and Bakija 
1994). 
As a result of this fiscal imbalance in the social security program, a number 
of  alternatives for reform have been considered, ranging from benefit reduc- 
tions or tax increases to the increased taxation of social security benefits, rais- 
ing the age of normal or early retirement, or even shifting partly or wholly into 
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a funded (privatized) system. A critical input into understanding the efficiency 
implications  of each of these alternatives is a model of how  social security 
affects retirement decisions. Social security is a dominant feature of the oppor- 
tunity  set facing older households in the United States. Ranking households 
where the head is over age sixty-five by the share of their income from social 
security, social security represents  51 percent of  total family income at the 
median; for 16 percent of such households, social security is the only source 
of  family  income.'  As a result,  it seems likely that the  structure of  the so- 
cial security program has important effects on the life-cycle savings and labor 
supply decision making of households and, in particular, on their retirement 
decisions. 
The purpose of  our paper is to provide an overview of the interaction be- 
tween  social security  and the  labor force behavior of  older persons in the 
United States. We do so in four steps. First, in section 11.1, we document the 
pertinent facts about the labor market behavior of older persons in the United 
States, both today and over time. Then, in section 11.2, we describe the struc- 
ture of the social security system in the United States, summarizing the rele- 
vant institutional details for thinking about retirement behavior. Finally, in sec- 
tion  11.3, we present the results of a simulation model designed to document 
the retirement incentives inherent in social security for current cohorts of retir- 
ees. We conclude our analysis in section 11.4. 
11.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older Persons in the United States 
One of the most striking trends in the U.S. labor market over the twentieth 
century has been the declining attachment to the labor force of older persons. 
In 1950, almost 60  percent of men aged sixty-five to sixty-nine were participat- 
ing in the labor force. By 1990, this figure had fallen to 26 percent. This dra- 
matic shift in the lifestyles of older men has prompted a large literature on its 
proximate causes, and a leading candidate is the growth of the social security 
program over this same time period. But, before addressing the effects of social 
security, it is useful to provide some more background  on the labor market 
behavior of older men and women. 
The historical  and contemporaneous facts presented  in  this  section  are 
drawn from a number of different data sources. These are summarized in ap- 
pendix A. In that appendix, we also provide a brief overview of the databases 
that are used by researchers in the United States to study retirement behavior. 
11.1.1  Historical Trends 
Figures 11.1 and 11.2 graph the labor force participation rates of  men and 
women in different age groups since 1960. We focus on four age groups: forty- 
five to fifty-four; fifty-five to fifty-nine; sixty to sixty-four; and sixty-five and 
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Fig. 11.1  Historical trends in labor force (LF) participation of older men 
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Fig. 11.2  Historical trends in labor force (LF) participation of older women 
over. For men, there is a decline in the labor force participation of  all these 
groups. The decline for the youngest group is slight, while the decline for sixty- 
to sixty-four-year-olds  is much more precipitous. There is also a large percent- 
age decline, albeit from a smaller base, for the oldest group. 
For women, the pattern is quite different: any trend toward earlier retirement 
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Fig. 11.3  Percentage of workers covered by the social security system 
those aged sixty to sixty-four, participation is rising; for the oldest group, par- 
ticipation declines slightly. 
One first-pass approach to considering whether social security is associated 
with these labor force trends is to examine related  trends in social security 
generosity. We do so in three ways. First, in figure 11.3, we show the share of 
the workforce  covered by  the social security system. By  1960, a very high 
share of the workforce was already covered by  social security, although that 
share grew steadily over the next thirty years. An important break in the series 
is after 1983, when a major reform brought several new sectors into the social 
security system; this reform is described further below. 
Second, in figure 11.4, we show the share of men and women over age fifty- 
five receiving social security benefits as well as the share receiving social secu- 
rity or disability insurance benefits.* There was a dramatic increase in the share 
of the older population receiving payments  from these public  schemes over 
time. In  1960, fewer than 40 percent of older men and fewer than 20 percent 
of older women received social security and disability insurance benefits. By 
1993, over 55 percent of  older men were receiving social security, and over 
65 percent were receiving either social security or disability insurance. For 
women, the percentage growth has been even more dramatic, with the result 
that by  1993 roughly 40  percent of women  are receiving social  security  or 
disability  insurance;  the  net  contribution  of  disability  insurance  is  much 
smaller for women than for men. 
2.  Social security benefits receipt refers to receipt of retired worker benefits only, which is re- 
stricted to those age sixty-two and over. Disabilily insurance receipt refers to receipt of  disabled 
worker benefits, which is not age restricted; but we use disability insurance recipients of  age fifty- 
five and over in the numerator of  our calculation. 441  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
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Fig. 11.5  Social security replacement rates (RRs) over time 
Third, we show the change in generosity of benefits payments over time in 
figure 11.5. We show the replacement rate from 1960 to 1991 for low-earnings, 
medium-earnings,  and  high-earnings  workers.  These replacement  rates  are 
computed for a sixty-five-year-old  single worker. In fact, social security re- 
placement rates were roughly constant until 1970  for all three groups. Replace- 
ment rates then  grew dramatically from 1970 to 1980, for reasons  that are 442  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
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Fig. 11.6  Labor force participation (LFP) rates by age and sex 
described below; this growth was especially dramatic for low earners, who saw 
their replacement rates rise by 50 percent, to 75 percent of their previous earn- 
ings level. Replacement rates then fell fairly precipitously beginning in 198  1. 
For high earners, replacement rates are now  actually lower than they  were 
in  1970, while, for average earners and low earners, they remain somewhat 
higher. 
These time-series patterns yield a mixed picture of  the influence of  social 
security. Clearly, there is a strong correlation between the size of  the program 
and the labor force participation rate of older men. But the decline in partici- 
pation of older men has continued unabated in the 1980s and 1990s, even as 
program generosity has declined. For women, any effects of social security are 
swamped by secular trends in time-series behavior. 
11.1.2  Labor Market Behavior in 1995 
For a more detailed understanding of the time pattern of labor force partici- 
pation in recent times, we turn to the March 1994 and 1995 Current Population 
Survey (CPS). The CPS is a large, nationally representative survey that asks 
individuals about their labor force attachment at both the point of  the survey 
and the previous year as well as about income in the previous year. We  pool 
two years of the CPS for added precision in our estimates of labor force partici- 
pation by age. 
The age pattern of nonparticipation for men and women is depicted in figure 
11.6. At age forty-five, the participation of men is significantly higher, although 
almost 80 percent of forty-five-year-old women are working in 1994-95. There 
is then a gradual parallel decline for men and women until age fifty-five, at 443  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
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Fig. 11.7  Distribution of activities of men by age 
which point the age pace steepens; this is particularly true for men, with the 
result that the participation gap closes substantially by age sixty-two. By age 
seventy-five, participation has dropped quite low, with fewer than 20 percent 
of men and 10 percent of women participating in the labor force. 
Figure  11.7 considers in more detail the allocation of time among men as 
they age, by dividing activities at each age into employment, unemployment, 
disability, and retirement. The top line, showing the share of men employed, 
mirrors the age trend in figure 11.6 above. There is very little age trend in either 
unemployment or disability, although both categories do shrink over time. The 
dominating trend here is increased retirement with age. This same exercise is 
repeated for women in figure 11.8; the patterns are very similar to those for 
men, although a much larger share of women is in “other” activities that are 
not captured by these four metrics (as can be seen by taking one minus the sum 
of the four values). 
11.1.3 
Figures 11.9 and 11.10 examine the incidence of public and private retire- 
ment income for older persons. Figure 11.9 graphs three series for men only: 
the rate of social security receipt; the rate of receipt of disability insurance and 
supplemental  security income; and the rate of receipt of income from other 
public assistance programs.3 Before age sixty-two, there is relatively little re- 
ceipt of public assistance income among men. There is a declining pattern of 
Income Sources of Older Persons 
3. Supplemental security income is cash welfare for low-income elders; the other categories 
represented here are unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and cash welfare (through 
the AFDC program or state welfare programs). 444  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
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Fig. 11.8  Distribution of activities of women by age 
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Fig. 11.9  Public income receipt for men (DI = disability insurance; SSI 
supplemental security income) 
other public assistance receipt, which is offset by a rising pattern of disability 
insurance/supplemental security income receipt. It is somewhat surprising that, 
under age sixty-two, a large number of men actually report receiving social 
security benefits. Some of this may be due to miscoding of disability insurance 
or supplemental security income; indeed, the reported  number  of  age sixty 
recipients of disability insurance in the CPS data is only about two-thirds of 445  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
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Fig. 11.10  Private pension receipt by sex 
the administrative totals. Some of this may be due to miscoding of family so- 
cial security receipt as own receipt among men with older wives, but this can 
explain only a small share of the total. And some may be due to simple miscod- 
ing, either of age or of the type of income being received. 
In any case, beginning at age sixty-two, the rate of receipt of social security 
skyrockets, until it is over 95 percent for those over age seventy-five. It is inter- 
esting to note that this increase in social security receipt is associated to a small 
extent with a decline in disability insurance/supplemental security income re- 
ceipt. This suggests that the net government cost of increased  social security 
receipt after age sixty-two is somewhat smaller than the social security budget 
alone would suggest. 
Figure 11.10 displays the percentage of men and women at each age who are 
receiving private pension income on their own account (as opposed to survivor 
benefits from a spouse's pension). This grows fairly rapidly from age fifty-five 
on, particularly for men, with the result that there is a rapidly growing gender 
gap; by age seventy-five, the rate of receipt for men is twice that for women. 
At the same time, however, some older women will be benefiting from survivor 
benefits paid through their husband's pension. 
Finally, figure  11.11 shows the distribution of income sources for couples, 
arrayed by the age of the head of the family.4 We consider the distribution of 
income across four sources:  earnings, capital income, private pensions,  and 
public transfers (predominantly social security for older couples, as shown in 
4.  This differs somewhat from previous figures, where the unit of  observation is the older per- 
son; we do this since these income concepts are best measured at the family level. 446  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
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Fig. 11.11  Distribution of family income by source 
fig. 11.9). Earnings are the dominant source of family income until age sixty, 
although, even for this younger subset of the sample, over 30 percent of income 
comes from other sources. Beginning at age sixty, earnings and capital income 
decline in proportional terms, and private pensions and public income (espe- 
cially the latter) grow as shares of income. The high share of income accounted 
for by public-sector income at older ages highlights the importance of social 
security for workers making their retirement decisions. 
11.2  Key Features of the Social Security System 
11.2.1  History of the Social Security System in the United States 
The landmark Social Security Act of 1935 created social security as well as 
the Aid to Dependent Children program, which was the start of  today’s cash 
welfare system. Originally, the act required that all workers in commerce and 
industry (except railroads) under age sixty-five be covered by social security. 
Over the years, the coverage of workers has steadily expanded; today, the only 
significant group of workers not covered by social security is some state and 
local government employees. At first, benefits for workers were available only 
for retired  workers over age sixty-five. In  1956, benefits  (reduced for early 
retirement) were made available to women between the ages of sixty-two and 
sixty-five. In  1961, the same treatment was extended to men. Dependent and 
survivor benefits were introduced in 1939, with benefits for wives and widows 
over age sixty-five and children under age eighteen.  In  1950, benefits  were 
extended to dependent husbands  and widowers over age sixty-five. In  1965, 
divorced wives became eligible for benefits provided the marriage had lasted 447  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
at least  ten years,  with  similar treatment extended to divorced husbands in 
1983. In 1956, benefits were extended to disabled workers over age fifty, with 
extension to disabled workers of all ages in 1960. 
Until  1972, it took  an act of  Congress to increase benefits. Tiring of  the 
repeated struggle over how much to increase benefits, the 1972 act introduced 
automatic increases in benefits  with increases in the consumer price index. 
This was done by continuing to base benefits on a lifetime average of earnings 
in nominal terms but increasing the benefit formula (as a function of lifetime 
earnings) in step with inflation. Unfortunately, since inflation affects both life- 
time nominal earnings and the relation between benefits and earnings, this act 
overindexed benefits. While this overindexing might have been roughly offset 
by  the nonlinearities  in the benefit formula had inflation remained low, with 
the large increase in inflation  in the  1970s this overindexing  led to a large, 
unintended  increase in benefits that placed the financing of social security in 
trouble. 
In 1977, the current benefit structure was adopted. After reaching retirement 
age, there is continued adjustment of benefits for increases in the CPI. Deter- 
mination of the level of benefits when reaching retirement age is now based on 
lifetime earnings using wage indexing. For each worker, there is calculation 
of the worker’s average indexed monthly earnings (A1ME)-an  average of a 
worker’s earnings (indexed by the average level of wages in the economy each 
year) over the highest thirty-five years of his or her career. The indexing is still 
not done quite right, with a gap of two years between the year used for the 
wage indexing of earnings (when the worker turns age sixty) and the year that 
CPI increases begin (when the worker turns age sixty-two) and no indexing of 
earnings after age sixty. This gap would become important if we had large and 
varying inflation rates. There has been controversy over the generations (re- 
ferred to as the notch babies) affected by the transition to the new sy~tem.~ 
The last major reform  of social security came in 1983, in the face of an 
imminent shortage of funds. This act addressed both short- and long-run  fi- 
nancial problems. The most notable of the changes affecting long-run consid- 
erations is a phased increase in the normal retirement age, from the current 
level of  sixty-five to sixty-seven, which is reached for workers reaching age 
sixty-two in 2022 and later. As legislated in  1983, the change in the normal 
retirement age does not change the age at which people can first claim retire- 
ment benefits, which remains at age sixty-two. But the amount of benefits re- 
ceived at age sixty-two, or at any other age, is made smaller if  the normal 
retirement  age is  older. When  the  normal  retirement  age is  sixty-seven,  a 
worker retiring at age sixty-two will receive 70 percent of the benefit formula 
amount (the PIA, or primary insurance amount), rather than  the 80 percent 
received now. Taxation of part of social security benefits began with the  1983 
legislation. Also, the incentive to continue working past the normal retirement 
age was increased. Someone first claiming benefits after the normal retirement 
5. For a further discussion of  the notch babies, see Krueger and Pischke (1992) 448  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
age has benefits increased by a delayed retirement credit. The 1977 legislation 
raised this credit to 3 percent per year, while the  1983 legislation phased in 
increases until the credit reaches 8 percent per year. 
The social security system was created by the same act that also created a 
program to provide aid to the poor elderly. In the early days, the elderly re- 
ceived more income from the welfare portion of this act than from social secu- 
rity. Over time, social security has outstripped aid to the aged; currently, the 
social security program is roughly ten times as large as the program of welfare 
for the low-income elderly and disabled (Supplemental Security Income). 
11.2.2  Current Features of the Social Security System 
The social security system in the United States today is financed by a payroll 
tax that is levied on workers and firms equally. The total payroll tax paid by 
each party is 7.65 percentage points; 5.3 percentage points are devoted to the 
old age and survivors insurance program, with 0.9 percentage points funding 
the disability insurance system and 1.45 percentage points funding Medicare’s 
hospital insurance program. The payroll tax that funds old age and survivors 
insurance and disability insurance is levied up only to the first $62,700 (in 
1996) of  earnings (the taxable maximum); the hospital insurance tax is un- 
capped.6 Like many other earnings figures in the law, this earnings limit is 
indexed to increase with average earnings in the economy. Part of the revenue 
from the income taxation of  social security benefits goes to social security. 
Social security also receives interest (at market rates) on its holdings of Trea- 
sury debt. 
Individuals qualify for an old age insurance pension by working for forty 
quarters in covered employment, which encompasses most sectors of the econ- 
omy in recent years.’  The process  of determination  of  the level of  benefits 
proceeds in several steps. The first step for qualifying workers is computation 
of the worker’s averaged indexed monthly earnings (AIME), which is one- 
twelfth of the average of the worker’s annual earnings in covered employment, 
indexed by a national wage index. This real wage history is averaged over the 
highest thirty-five years of earnings. Earlier, a shorter averaging period was 
used to reflect the immaturity of the system. A key feature of this process is 
that additional higher-earnings years can replace earlier lower-earnings years 
since only thirty-five years are used in the calculation.8 
6.  This cap is 2.4 times the median earnings of a full-year (forty-eight weeks or more), full-time 
(thirty-five hours or more per week) worker; 92 percent of such workers earn less than this amount. 
7. Notable exceptions are state and local employees, some of whom are covered and some not. 
The current Social Security Advisory Council has recommended mandatory coverage in this sec- 
tor, starting with newly hired workers. Many of these workers will receive benefits anyway because 
of  covered work, before, after, or as a second job during their current employment. 
8. In particular, while earnings through age fifty-nine are converted to real dollars for averaging, 
earnings after age sixty are treated nominally. There is a two-year lag in availability of the wage 
index, calling for a base in the year in which the worker turns age sixty in order to be  able to 
compute benefits for workers retiring at their sixty-second birthday. While it would be possible to 449  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
The next  step of  the benefits calculation is to convert the AIME into the 
primary insurance amount (PIA). This is done by applying a three-piece linear 
progressive schedule to an individual’s average earnings, whereby ninety cents 
of the first dollar of  earnings is converted to benefits while only fifteen cents 
of the last dollar of  earnings (up to the taxable maximum) is so converted. As 
a result, the rate at which social security replaces past earnings (the “replace- 
ment rate”) falls with the level of lifetime earnings. For a worker with no de- 
pendents whose earnings had grown at the same rate as average earnings in the 
economy and who retired at age sixty-five in 1995 with a 1994 level of earn- 
ings of $15,000, the replacement rate is 50 percent. For 1994 earnings levels 
of  $25,000, $35,000, and $45,000,  the replacement rates are 43 percent, 37 
percent,  and 30 percent, respectively. For someone who  always earned the 
maximum  amount  subject to taxation,  the  replacement  rate  is  24 percent. 
While 85 percent of social security benefits are subject to tax for retirees with 
sufficiently high incomes (couples with incomes above $32,000 in 1993), all 
earnings are taxed (including the employee portion of the payroll tax), raising 
the effective replacement rate of the program. Also, many social security recip- 
ients are in a lower tax bracket than they were before retirement. 
Adjustments to the level of the PIA are made on the basis of the age at which 
benefits are first claimed. For workers claiming before the normal retirement 
age (currently sixty-five but legislated to increase slowly to sixty-seven), bene- 
fits are decreased by five-ninths of 1 percent per month, so that the benefits of 
those  claiming  on their  sixty-second birthday  are  80 percent  of  what  they 
would be if they waited until the normal retirement age. The size of the reduc- 
tion factor will be only five-twelfths of  I  percent for months beyond thirty-six 
months before the normal retirement age, which will become relevant once the 
delay in the normal retirement age becomes effective. The reduction is called 
the actuarial reduction  factol: Individuals can also delay the receipt of benefits 
beyond  age sixty-five and receive  a delayed  retirement credit. For workers 
reaching age sixty-five in 1996, an additional 5 percent is paid for each year of 
delayed receipt of benefits. Under current legislation, this amount will steadily 
increase until it reaches 8 percent per year in 2009. 
While one can claim as early as age sixty-two, receipt  of  social security 
benefits is conditioned on the “earnings test” until the worker reaches age sev- 
enty: if one earns more than a certain floor level, social security benefits are 
reduced for each additional dollar of earnings, until, at high earnings levels, 
one cannot qualify at all. In order to receive all his or her benefits, in 1995 a 
worker must have earnings below $8,280 if between the ages of sixty-two and 
sixty-five and below  $12,500 if between  the  ages of  sixty-five and seventy. 
These figures increase each year with average earnings in the economy. Bene- 
make adjustments as data become available, this is not done, with all later years entering the AIME 
calculation without any adjustment for further growth in the national average wage index. This 
gap would become important if we had large and varying inflation rates. 450  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
fits are reduced for any earnings above this limit, $1.00 for each $2.00 of earn- 
ings for workers between the ages of  sixty-two and sixty-five and $1.00 for 
every $3.00 for workers between the ages of sixty-five and seventy. There is a 
special monthly retirement test for workers in their first year of  retirement. In 
1996 legislation, the earnings limit for those between the ages of sixty-five and 
sixty-nine has been increased in a series of steps, reaching $30,000 in 2002. 
Months of benefits lost through the earnings test are treated as delayed receipt, 
entitling the worker to a delayed retirement credit on the lost benefits when he 
does claim benefits. 
There are also important additional benefit provisions based on family struc- 
ture.  Spouses  of  social  security  beneficiaries  receive  an  additional  benefit, 
which is 50 percent of the PIA, beginning at age sixty-two, although a spouse 
receives only the larger of this and her own entitlement as a ~orker.~  Depen- 
dent children are also each eligible for 50 percent of  the PIA, but the total 
family benefit  cannot  exceed a maximum  that  varies  with PIA level but  is 
roughly  175 percent of the PIA. Surviving spouses receive 100 percent of the 
PIA, beginning at age sixty, although there is an actuarial reduction for claim- 
ing widow benefits before age sixty-five or if the worker had an actuarial reduc- 
tion. The benefits for dependents  are somewhat complicated by  the fact that 
both spouses may qualify for social security benefits  as retired workers. For 
previous  generations,  where  wives  generally  earned  substantially  less  over 
their lifetimes than their husbands, this was not such an important consider- 
ation. But, in recent times, it is quite frequent that wives will earn enough so 
that they would have a PIA of at least half that of their husbands and so will not 
automatically use the default of dependent benefits; benefits are the maximum 
receivable under different provisions. Currently, of the 20 million female bene- 
ficiaries of social security, 7.5 million are entitled solely as workers, 5 million 
are entitled both as workers and as dependentshrvivors, and another 7.5 mil- 
lion are entitled solely as dependents or survivors. 
Benefit payments are adjusted for increases in the consumer price index after 
the worker has reached  age sixty-two. Thus, social  security provides  a real 
annuity to its recipients. Social security benefits are largely tax favored: they 
are taxed only if the sum of other income and half of social security benefits 
exceed $32,000 for a joint return, and even at that point they are only par- 
tially taxed. 
Finally, it is important to note that the social security program does not oper- 
ate in a vacuum. There are a number of other public assistance programs for 
which elderly persons  are eligible that  may also have effects on their labor 
market behavior.  One such program  is disability  insurance,  which  provides 
income insurance to workers physically unable to participate in the labor force. 
Given the difficulty of distinguishing true career-ending disability, particularly 
in the near elderly population, this program also potentially has an effect on 
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the retirement decisions of  older workers. Indeed, there is a large empirical 
literature in recent  years that suggests that variations  in disability insurance 
program parameters do affect labor force participation among those aged forty- 
five to sixty-five (see, e.g., Bound 1989, 1991; Gruber 1996; Gruber and Kubik 
1997; Leonard  1986; and Parsons 1980, 1991a, 1991b). 
Moreover, there is an important interaction between disability insurance and 
social security. As noted above, if individuals receive social security benefits 
before the normal retirement age of sixty-five, they are reduced by five-ninths 
of  1 percent per month. However, if an individual with the same earnings tra- 
jectory qualifies for disability insurance, then he or she receives the full social 
security entitlement with no reduction.1° It is unclear how substitutable social 
security early retirement and disability insurance are, but this potentially re- 
duces any savings to the government from lowering the benefits for early retire- 
ment, or raising the age of early eligibility, without changing the benefit struc- 
ture for disabled  workers.  This  is highlighted  by  figure  11.9 above, which 
showed the interaction between the rise in social security receipt and the de- 
cline in disability insurance receipt around age sixty-two. 
Another public assistance program that potentially interacts with social se- 
curity is the supplemental security income program,  which provides  income 
support to the low-income elderly (defined as at least age sixty-five) and disa- 
bled  individuals. Unlike social security or disability insurance, benefits  and 
eligibility for supplemental security income are conditioned on point-in-time 
income rather than lifetime income. The size of the supplemental security in- 
come recipient population is small relative to social security recipients; fewer 
than 4 percent of social security recipients age sixty-five and older also receive 
supplemental security income. On the other hand, over two-thirds of  supple- 
mental security income recipients do receive some social security income. So 
supplemental security income is serving both as an alternative to social secu- 
rity for very low-income elderly and as a supplement for those with very low 
social security income. 
There are also large private incentives for retirement embedded in firm pen- 
sion plans. Pension coverage has grown dramatically in the postwar period, 
and, in 1994, roughly 45 percent of workers aged twenty-one to sixty-five were 
covered by a pension plan at work."  Given the age structure in the pattern of 
job holding relative to pension provision, a noticeably larger fraction of work- 
ers is covered by pension provisions  at some time in their careers than  this 
number suggests. On the other hand, some fraction of workers cashes out their 
pension  accumulations when  changing jobs, leaving no accumulation  when 
reaching retirement. In 1994, 35 percent of retired workers over age sixty-two 
who were receiving social security were receiving pension income as well. A 
10. This calculation is complicated, of course, by the fact that additional work can affect the 
11. Authors' tabulations from March 1995 Current Population Survey. 
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number of papers in recent years have suggested that pension incentives play 
an important role in determining retirement behavior among covered workers; 
this may interact with the social security incentives described below (see Stock 
and Wise 1990; or Samwick 1993). 
Finally, for understanding the role of social security, it is important to con- 
sider this program in the broader context of the treatment of older workers in 
the labor force. The United States has a broad set of protections in place pre- 
serving the rights  of older workers  through  the  1967 Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, including legal restrictions on age-of-hire rules and on man- 
datory retirement (Parsons 1996). This levels the playing field between older 
and younger workers for labor supply decision making, highlighting the poten- 
tial importance for retirement decisions of financial incentives  such as those 
through social security. 
11.2.3  The Retirement Effects of Social Security-Theory  and Evidence 
There is a large U.S.-based literature that describes both the expected effects 
of the social security system on retirement and evidence on the actual retire- 
ment effects of the program. The motivation for examining the effects of social 
security can be seen clearly by examining the hazard rate out of the labor force 
for men and women. This is measured as the increase in the rate of labor force 
leaving from the previous age, relative to the stock of workers participating at 
the previous age. Figure  11.12 shows the hazard rate for labor force leaving 
for men. The striking fact about this figure is the dramatic increase in labor 
force leaving at age sixty-two, which is the age of eligibility for early retire- 
ment under social security, and at age sixty-five, which is the normal retirement 
age. These spikes are very suggestive of a role for social security in explaining 
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Fig. 11.13  Hazard rate out of the labor force for women 
the retirement behavior of men. There is also a small spike around age fifty- 
five, which may reflect the early retirement provisions at that age under many 
pension plans. There is also another spike around age sixty-eight; the cause 
here is not clear, although the small denominator of the participation hazard 
after age sixty-five makes it hard to interpret this finding.'* 
The hazard rate for women is plotted in figure 11.13. The spike at age sixty- 
five is apparent  here  as well, but the spike at age sixty-two is not  as pro- 
nounced. This may reflect the fact that female retirement is determined more 
by joint timing with husbands than by social security incentives. 
In appendix A, we discuss theoretically the various effects that social secu- 
rity has on retirement behavior and then review the extensive U.S.-based litera- 
ture on social security and retirement. We highlight the sources of agreement 
and disagreement in the existing  literature and conclude that  there is fairly 
broad agreement that the overall structure of  social security is an important 
determinant of retirement, even while there remains disagreement over the ef- 
fects of variations in program generosity within this structure. 
11.3  Retirement Incentives 
In this section, we use a model of social security benefits determination to 
assess the incentives of  social security on retirement through accrual rate ef- 
fects. 
12. That is, the spike at age sixty-five represents a 9.5 percentage point change in labor force 
participation, while the spike at age sixty-eight represents only a 4.5 percentage point change; the 
latter appears almost as large as the former because the denominator is so much smaller. 454  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
11.3.1  Simulation Modeling 
The basis for our analysis is the Social Security Administration's ANYPIA 
~rogram.'~  This program inputs a set of worker characteristics: age, wife's age, 
earnings history, and date of retirement. It then computes the benefits entitle- 
ment for a given month in the future. To  do so, we use the social security 
base-case assumptions about price and wage growth in the future. The program 
computes the benefits for the worker, dependent benefits for married workers, 
and survivor benefits for the case where the worker has died. 
The next step in our simulation is to take these monthly benefit entitlements 
and compute an expected net present discounted value of social security wealth 
(SSW). This requires projecting benefits out until workers reach age one hun- 
dred and then taking a weighted sum that discounts future benefits by both the 
individual discount rate and the prospects that the worker will live to a given 
future age.I4  Our methodology for doing so is described in appendix A. For the 
worker himself, this is fairly straightforward; it is simply a sum of future bene- 
fits, discounted backward by time preference rates and mortality rates. For de- 
pendent and survivor benefits, it is more complicated since we must account 
for the joint likelihood of survival of the worker and the dependent. In our base 
case, we use a real discount rate of 3 percent. To adjust for mortality prospects, 
we use the sedage-specific US. life tables from U.S. Department of  Health 
and Human Services (1990).  Finally, to compute net social security wealth, we 
subtract out social security payroll  tax  payments that the  individual would 
make during any continued work. We add both the employee and the employer 
shares of the payroll tax, under the assumption that the employer share is fully 
borne by the worker in the form of lower wages. All figures are discounted 
back to age fifty-five by both time preference rates and mortality risk. 
For the output of the simulations, we calculate three different concepts. The 
first is the net of tax replacement rate, the rate at which social security replaces 
the (after-tax) earnings of the worker should he continue working in that year. 
It is important to do this calculation on an after-tax basis in order to account 
for the fact that social security benefits are not taxed for most families while 
earnings are. We do so by modeling the average tax rate faced by earners of 
different earnings levels in each year and whether they are subject to taxation 
of their social security benefits. The second concept is the accrual rate, the 
percentage change in social security wealth from the previous year. 
Finally, we compute a taxlsubsidy rate, which is the absolute change in so- 
cial security wealth over the potential earnings from working that next year. 
13. We are grateful to Steve McKay of the Social Security Administration for his assistance in 
applying this program to our purposes. 
14. We have experimented with extending the model to account for ages up to 120 since this is 
the extent of the life-table information available. This had  little effect on the results, however, 
since so few persons are alive beyond age one hundred. 455  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
This represents the implicit tax on or subsidy to continued work in terms of 
the net change in social security wealth that is implied by that additional year 
of work. The numerator of this taxhbsidy rate is the opposite of the change 
in social security wealth from working the additional year. The denominator is 
the potential earnings over that additional year. Thus, if this figure is positive, 
it implies that the social security system causes a disincentive to additional 
work through forgone social security wealth. This is the relevant concept for 
the worker who is trading off  leisure (on social security) against continued 
work. 
Note that, in computing these concepts, we use the unconditional mortality 
risk beyond age fifty-five; that is, there is some probability that the worker may 
be dead at each year after his fifty-fifth birthday. An alternative approach would 
be to use conditional life tables at each year, with the result that, for the worker 
considering retiring on his sixty-third birthday, we discount the future by  the 
age sixty-threexonditional life table. The correct approach here depends on 
the perspective from which this computation is taken. Our approach is appro- 
priate if the computation is taken from the perspective of the forward-looking 
fifty-four-year-old  who is considering  the retirement  incentives at all future 
ages. The alternative  would be appropriate for year-by-year  decision making 
about retirement. Since we discount all our dollar figures back to age fifty-five 
by both time preference and mortality risk, both concepts yield the same tax/ 
subsidy effects (since both numerator and denominator are deflated); however, 
they will yield somewhat different values of social security wealth and there- 
fore different accrual rates. 
For the purposes of  the simulations outlined below, we assume that workers 
claim social security benefits  either at the point of their retirement or when 
they become eligible if they retire before the point of eligibility. In fact, this is 
not necessarily true; retirement and claiming are two distinct events, and, for 
certain values of mortality prospects and discount rates, it is optimal to delay 
claiming until sometime after retirement (owing to the actuarial adjustment of 
benefits). In fact, a nontrivial share of individuals who retire before age sixty- 
two delay claiming their benefits for at least one year. We plan to explore this 
issue further in future work. 
To  produce our base-case  numbers, we use a typical individual who was 
born in January  1930 and thus turned sixty-five in January  1995. In theory, to 
calculate benefits for a worker, we would need his entire earnings history. In 
practice, we use a “synthetic” earnings history, which uses the median earnings 
of  a cohort through  time. As a first step in creating  this synthetic  earnings 
history, we use information on the median earnings by calendar year and age 
cohort from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (various years). 
More specifically, we use the median earnings of a sixty-one-year-old in 1991 
(the last available year of data) as our base point and then follow this cohort 
back through time (using the median for sixty-year-olds in  1990, fifty-nine- 
year-olds in  1989, and so on). We then update this to ages beyond age sixty- 456  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
Table 11.1  Base-Case Incentive Calculation 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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one by using the age-earnings profile for 1991, along with actual inflation data 
and base-case inflation assumptions. 
In pursuing this calculation, we found a relatively steep decline in median 
earnings after about  age fifty, which  presumably reflects the fact that more 
and more of  the earning population is working only part-time. However, our 
synthetic individual is considering the decision to work full-time for an addi- 
tional year, so this skews the true nature of the underlying earnings history. As 
a result, we use this synthetic earnings profile through age fifty and then as- 
sume that earnings stay constant in real terms from age fifty-one on. 
We  assume initially  that the worker’s wife is exactly three years younger 
than he. We also assume that she has never worked, with the result that she 
claims as a dependent spouse only and not as a worker as well. 
11.3.2  Base-Case Results 
Table 11.1 shows our base-case results. Each row represents the age of the 
worker in the last year that he works; that is, the first row represents the effect 
of  working during the fifty-fourth year and retiring on the fifty-fifth birthday 
(1 January 1985). The first column shows the net replacement rate. This con- 
cept is not defined until the worker can actually claim benefits, which occurs 
if his last year of work is at age sixty-one and he retires at age sixty-two. 
At that first point of possible claiming, the replacement rate is roughly 40 
percent.15 This rises somewhat over time as workers increase their social secu- 
15. This is lower than the replacement rates used in fig. 11.5 above since our base-case worker 
has higher earnings than the “average” worker used in that figure. 457  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
rity benefits by delaying claiming. The major change occurs for retirement on 
the sixty-fifth birthday, when the wife turns age sixty-two, since at that point 
the spouse becomes entitled to dependent benefits. This jump in replacement 
rates is somewhat artificial in that the worker who retires at age sixty-two will 
also see a jump at his sixty-fifth birthday, when his wife turns age sixty-two. 
That is, the replacement rate rises at age sixty-five regardless  of the age of 
retirement. For the worker who works through his sixty-ninth year and collects 
on his seventieth birthday, social security replaces almost 90 percent  of  his 
after-tax earnings. 
The next three columns show the evolution of social security wealth over 
time. In order to understand these results, it is useful to recap the four mecha- 
nisms through which additional work affects the computation of social security 
wealth: (1) The worker must pay social security taxes on his earnings, lowering 
net social security wealth. (2) The additional year of earnings is used in the 
recomputation  of  social  security  benefits.  For  workers  who  have  not  yet 
worked thirty-five years, this additional year will be replacing a zero in the 
benefits computation; for workers  who have worked thirty-five years, it will 
potentially be replacing a previous low-earnings year. For both these reasons, 
additional work raises net  social security  wealth.  (3) The additional  year of 
work, for work at ages sixty-two and beyond, implies a delay in claiming. This 
raises  future benefits  through  the actuarial adjustment, but  it implies fewer 
years over which benefits can be claimed. As  a result, there is an ambiguous 
effect on net social security wealth. (4) For each year into the future that we 
consider, there is some chance that the worker will die, lowering his net social 
security wealth. This is related to mechanism 3; the probability  of  mortality 
raises the required actuarial adjustment to make the worker indifferent to de- 
layed claiming. Thus, it is unclear ex ante whether the social security system 
will tax or subsidize additional work in any given case. 
As table 11.1  shows, a worker who retires on his fifty-fifth birthday has accu- 
mulated roughly $110,000 in social security wealth. There is then a small in- 
crease in social security wealth for work during the fifty-fifth year; this is be- 
cause that next year “completes” the worker’s earnings history, with that year 
of earnings therefore replacing a zero in the benefits computation. After this 
point, additional earnings affect the benefits computation only to the extep 
that they replace earlier, lower-earnings years. With a more variable earnings 
history, as we show below, this “completion” effect will lower the tax rate at 
older ages as well. 
For work in the fifty-sixth to sixty-first years,  social security  wealth  uni- 
formly declines. This decline is driven by two factors: the fact that the worker 
has some (small) chance  of  dying16 and, more  important, the  fact  that  the 
16. That is, since we discount mortality from the perspective of  age fifty-five, a worker who is 
considering retiring at age fifty-six relative to age fifty-seven has a slightly higher chance of receiv- 
ing his benefits, increasing his social security wealth. 458  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
worker is paying the social security payroll tax if he continues to work. As a 
result, the accrual rate is negative; there is roughly a 1-1.2  percent decline in 
social security wealth each year from continued work. 
The final column shows the taxkubsidy rate. There is a slight subsidy to 
work in the fifty-fifth year, as noted above, and then taxes on work in the fifty- 
sixth through sixty-first years. This tax, however, is lower than the statutory 
social security payroll tax rate. This differential arises because these additional 
years of  earnings are replacing lower-earnings years in the benefits computa- 
tion. Thus, there is some taxbenefit linkage in this age range. 
There is then a slight  subsidy to work during the sixty-second year. This 
subsidy arises because the worker receives an actuarial adjustment for delaying 
claiming  benefits,  which  offsets  both  the  payroll  tax  and  the  fact that  the 
worker is claiming one year later. That is, for work during the sixty-second 
year, the  system is roughly actuarially  “fair.””  The fact that the tax rate on 
continued work actually declines at age sixty-two while retirement jumps up 
at that age (fig. 1 1.12 above) is striking and casts some doubt on the full ratio- 
nality/perfect markets model often used to explain the effects of social security 
on retirement. This spike at age sixty-two is more likely associated with either 
the market imperfections or individual irrationalities discussed  in the theory 
section of appendix B. 
During the sixty-third year, the actuarial adjustment is roughly sufficient to 
compensate for the taxes paid and the smaller number of years of  collecting 
benefits, and there is no net tax or subsidy. There is then a nontrivial tax rate 
in the sixty-fourth year. For work during the sixty-fifth year, the tax rate jumps 
up dramatically. For this  worker, working  during his sixty-fifth year means 
forgoing over $2,450 in social security wealth, which amounts to almost  19 
percent of  what he would earn during that year. This is because the delayed 
retirement credit is actuarially unfair, given the forgone year of social security 
benefits. This tax rate rises further with age, with the result that, for the deci- 
sion to work during the seventieth year, forgone social security wealth amounts 
to almost half of what he would earn during thafyear. There is an explicit jump 
for work in the  sixty-eighth year due to spousal claiming behavior. For the 
spouse, as for the worker, there is a penalty to delaying claiming past age sixty- 
five. Since we assume that both  the worker and his spouse claim when the 
worker retires, then his working during his sixty-eighth year means that his 
spouse will not claim until after age sixty-five and so will be penalized. It is 
important to note, however, that future changes in the delayed retirement credit 
put in place by the  1983 legislation substantially lower these work disincen- 
tives. 
17.  Actuai-ialfairness here refers to the net of taxes and benefits, not to the structure of  bene- 
fits only. 459  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
Table 11.2  Incentive Calculation-Single  Worker 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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11.3.3  Other Cases 
Table 11.2 explores these same results for a single worker. In this case, there 
are slightly higher tax rates before  the sixty-second  year-for  two reasons. 
First, in the married case, if the worker dies, his wife will still get survivor 
benefits, and the discounting for mortality is therefore not as severe as it is for 
the single worker. Second, the gains from benefits recomputation  are smaller 
for the single worker since higher benefits affect only him and not both him 
and his spouse. That is, recomputing  benefits for the married  worker has a 
much larger effect both because each additional dollar of benefits turns into an 
additional $1 .50 through the spousal benefit and because that extra dollar be- 
comes an extra dollar of benefits to the surviving spouse as well. Yet both the 
married  and the  single worker pay the same payroll  tax, so this results in a 
larger net disincentive for the single worker. 
Interestingly, for the single worker, this disincentive does not diminish no- 
ticeably for work during the sixty-second year. Here, the system is actuarially 
unfair; the extra benefits in future years from delaying claiming are outweighed 
by the forgone year of claiming and the taxes paid. So, for work during ages 
sixty-two to sixty-seven, the system offers much larger disincentives to single 
than  to married workers; by  age sixty-seven, the implicit tax rate is over 40 
percent. On the other hand, for work during ages sixty-eight and sixty-nine, 
the tax rate is actually lower for single workers owing to the unfairness  of 
the delayed retirement credit for both spouses in the married worker case (as 
described above). 
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 show the effect of considering different earnings histor- 460  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
Table 11.3  Incentive Calculation-Tenth  Percentile Married Earners 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax / 
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Table 11.4  Incentive Calculation-Ninetieth  Percentile Married Earners 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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ies for a married worker. We consider two additional cases: that of a worker at 
the tenth percentile of the earnings distribution and that of  a worker  at the 
ninetieth percentile of the distribution. Since we do not have true longitudinal 
data, we assume that the age/earnings profile is the same at the tenth and nineti- 
eth percentiles as at the median and just use data on the 1995 differences across 
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Fig. 11.14  Taxhbsidy rates across earnings profiles 
These changes have important effects on the retirement incentives inherent 
in social security. As the first column of table 11.3 shows, the replacement rate 
is much higher for the low-earnings worker, confirming the findings of figure 
11.5 above. The time pattern of taxhbsidy rates across earnings groups is also 
shown in figure 11.14. Before age sixty-two, there is a somewhat higher tax 
rate on high-wage workers since the taxbenefit linkage is reduced by the re- 
distributive nature of  benefits computation. From age sixty-two to age sixty- 
four, there is a large subsidy to continued work for the low-earnings workers, 
while there is a tax on the high earners. This reflects the fact that the low- 
earnings workers are getting a much higher return from their social security 
contributions at this age. This pattern reverses from age sixty-five on, however, 
as the large negative accruals implicit in social security at older ages are much 
larger on the smaller base of  earnings at the tenth percentile. By age sixty- 462  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
Table 11.5  Incentive Calculation-Incomplete  Earnings History for 
Married Workers 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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nine, the implicit tax rate on low-earnings workers is over twice that on high 
earners. 
Table 11.5 considers a different permutation to the earnings history: assum- 
ing that the worker did not start work until  1929 and therefore has an incom- 
plete earnings history  (fewer than thirty-five  years  of  work)  until  he works 
during his sixty-third year. This has a striking effect on the incentives before 
age sixty-four. In the place of sizable tax rates on continued work before age 
sixty-two, there are now small subsidies; and, in the place of a small subsidy 
at age sixty-two, there is now a much larger subsidy. That is, for a worker with 
this incomplete earnings history, working during the sixty-second year receives 
a subsidy of  15 percent owing to the value of replacing a zero in the average 
monthly earnings computation. Once this worker reaches age sixty-four, how- 
ever, the incentives are identical to those for the base case since the earnings 
history has been completed. 
11.4  Conclusions 
The social security program is an important feature of the opportunity set of 
workers making their retirement decisions. There is clear evidence from both 
previous work and hazard rate diagrams that the broad structure of the social 
security program influences retirement timing. Evidence on the effects of vari- 
ation in the benefits provided by  this program  is less clear, however. In this 
paper, we have explicitly documented the implicit tax rates on continued work 
from this system. We find that, on average, for married men with nonearning 463  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
spouses, there is little net tax on continued work around the age of early eligi- 
bility for social security but that the tax becomes quite large at the normal re- 
tirement age. There is important heterogeneity in these incentives across work- 
ers, however, according to features such as marital status and earnings. 
The implications of  these findings depend critically on the elasticity of the 
response of retirement behavior to the implicit tax rates of the social security 
program. As we have noted, this elasticity remains a source of empirical con- 
troversy. Future work  in this area could employ recent high-quality  data on 




Labor force participation by age and sex (figs. 11.1 and 11.2 above) is taken 
from US.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (various years). Share of workers covered 
and replacement rates (figs. 11.3 and 11.5 above) are taken from U.S. Congress 
(1993). Receipt of social security/disability insurance by age and sex (fig. 11.4 
above) and median earnings by  cohort over time (simulations) are taken from 
US.  Department of Health and Human Services (1995). 
Contemporaneous Data 
data for 1994 and 1995. 
All contemporaneous figures are tabulated by the authors from March CPS 
Studying Retirement in the United States 
There are two types of data available for studying retirement in the United 
States: 
1. The first are cross-sectional data on participation at a point in time. The 
CPS is one of  a variety of cross-sectional surveys available. Another of note is 
the National  Health  Interview  Survey (NHIS), which  also has health infor- 
mation. 
2.  The second are longitudinal data that follow individuals over time, provid- 
ing information on demographics, labor force attachment, and income sources. 
Some examples here are (a)  the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP, 1984-present),  which follows a large sample of persons over a period 
of two to three years; (b)  the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1968- 
present), which has followed a smaller sample of persons since 1968; (c)  the 
Retirement  History  Survey  (RHS,  1969-79)  and the National  Longitudinal 
Surveys of Older Men and Women (NLS, 1968-present),  which follow large 
samples of older persons over time, the former survey containing detailed in- 464  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
formation on the worker’s entire earnings history; and (d)  the Health and Re- 
tirement Survey (HRS, 1992-present),  which updates the RHS with a new co- 
hort of older persons that will be followed for at least ten years. The HRS 
has the richest data yet available from a retirement survey, including detailed 
information on earnings histories and firm pension plans. 
Appendix B 
The Effect of Social Security on Retirement- 
Theory and Evidence 
Theory 
The major role that social security plays in determining the well-being  of 
the elderly, as well as the dramatic spikes in labor force participation and retire- 
ment at exactly the ages of  social security entitlement in figures  11.12 and 
11.13 above, suggest that social security  is a key  determinant of  retirement 
behavior. But, in practice, it is quite complicated to model the effects of social 
security on retirement. In this section, we provide an overview of the effects 
of the system on retirement. This discussion draws heavily on Crawford and 
Lillien (1981); for a related discussion, see Burtless and Moffitt (1986). 
The discussion proceeds in three steps. First, we consider the effects of so- 
cial security on retirement in a perfect markevfull rationality setting. Then we 
examine the implications of  effects coming from imperfections in the credit 
and insurance markets. Finally, we consider the implications of behavioral re- 
sponses that do not correspond to the full rationality model. 
In a full rationality/perfect markets setting, one has two types of effects of 
social security on retirement: income effects and substitution effects. Insofar 
as the  system increases the lifetime wealth  of an individual,  it will tend to 
induce earlier retirement (assuming that leisure is a normal good). Such redis- 
tributions happen across generations, particularly from the large benefits com- 
ing with an underfunded pay-as-you-go  system. Such redistribution  also hap- 
pens  within  a generation,  reflecting  both  deliberate redistributions  and  the 
redistributional effects of other policies. For example, the progressivity in the 
benefit formula is a redistribution to lower earners, for a given life expectancy 
(although life expectancy does vary  systematically with income level). The 
presence of spouse benefits represents a redistribution from the never married 
to couples with different earnings histories. The use of an approach based on 
giving a maximum of an earned benefit and a spouse or surviving spouse bene- 
fit redistributes among couples, giving more to couples that have very different 
earnings levels, particularly one-earner couples. The presence of child benefits 
helps those having children late in life (so that the children are still young when 465  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
the worker retires). Since  benefits are paid as an annuity, with the same formula 
for all, the system redistributes toward those who, ex ante, have greater life 
expectancies. There are similar effects from the disability insurance portion of 
the program. In terms of substitution effects, one needs to consider the finan- 
cial implications of continuing work once eligible for retirement benefits, as 
documented above. 
Once one moves away from a perfect market setting, one cannot infer the 
effects of  social security solely from their implications for the shape of the 
lifetime budget constraint. There are two effects that have been recognized in 
the literature. Insofar as it is difficult to borrow against future earnings, some 
young workers will be liquidity constrained, consuming less than they would 
if they could borrow against future earnings. The payroll tax tightens this con- 
straint, resulting in even lower consumption among such workers. As a result 
of  having consumed less when young, these workers may have more wealth 
when reaching retirement age, resulting in an income effect leading to earlier 
retirement. 
With imperfect individual annuity markets, social security is providing real 
annuities that are not available in the market. Correction of this market failure 
has two effects. One is that the greater efficiency  in planning  lifetime con- 
sumption associated with annuitization works like an income effect, resulting 
in earlier retirement. Second, the link between work and the size of these annu- 
ities is an incentive for additional work at retirement age. Moreover, the inabil- 
ity to tap this source of wealth until reaching the early retirement age will lead 
some of  those who would otherwise have chosen to retire before this age to 
continue to work until retirement age. 
Turning to individual irrationalities, it is a premise of social security systems 
that many individuals would not save enough to finance retirement in the ab- 
sence of  compulsion. Forcing people to save more than they would (myopi- 
cally) choose to results in greater wealth  at retirement age and therefore an 
income effect leading to earlier retirement. Also relevant is the possibility  of 
myopia in making the retirement decision itself, based on evaluating only the 
consumption possibilities in the near term rather than over the full remaining 
life span. This might result in some people retiring too soon.'*  Limiting eligi- 
bility until the early retirement age reduces this effect. 
A further element comes into focus once one considers a couple. Poverty 
rates among widows are roughly three times as high as among married women 
of the same age. This suggests that many couples are not choosing sizable joint 
life annuitization. Insofar as social security requires partial joint life annuitiza- 
tion that would not have been chosen by the couple, it lowers consumption of 
the workers at retirement age and may lead to more work. 
18. One must be careful here in measuring the degree of rationality about retirement decisions. 
For example, from the perspective of maximizing family social security wealth, a given husband 
may appear to retire too early. However, if he downweights his wife's consumption in his utility 
function, his decision may be individually rational. 466  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
Evidence 
There is an enormous empirical literature that attempts to evaluate the ef- 
fects that social security has had on retirement behavior. There are two broad 
strands of this literature. The first uses aggregate information on the labor force 
behavior of workers at different ages over time to infer the role that is played 
by social security. Hurd (1990) and Ruhm (1995) emphasize the spike in the 
age pattern of retirement at age sixty-two; as Hurd (1990, 597, no. 42) states, 
“There are no other institutional or economic reasons for the peak.” Moreover, 
both authors show that this peak has grown over time as social security gener- 
osity has increased; and Burtless and Moffitt (1986) show that this peak was 
not present in 1960, before this early retirement option was available. As Ruhm 
(1995) notes, however, the existence of  this peak does not prove that social 
security is lowering participation rates among all older workers; in fact, it may 
be inducing longer  work among those aged sixty  and  sixty-one in order to 
qualify for early retirement at age sixty-two. 
Moreover, for workers  for whom the actuarial adjustment, additional  tax, 
and AIME recomputation is fair on average, there is no reason for social secu- 
rity per se to induce a spike at age sixty-two; it is only an interaction of social 
security with liquidity constraints that would yield this response. Indeed, this 
is exactly what Kahn (1988) finds; there is a spike in retirement at age sixty- 
two for low-wealth workers but not for very high-wealth workers. 
There is also a large spike in retirement at age sixty-five, as noted by many 
analysts, that would be consistent with the traditionally unfair actuarial adjust- 
ment made by social security for additional work beyond age sixty-five. In- 
deed, using more precise quarterly data, Blau  (1994) finds that almost one- 
quarter of  the men  remaining in the  labor force at their  sixty-fifth birthday 
retire within the next three months; this hazard rate is over 2.5 times as large 
as the rate in surrounding quarters. However, Lumsdaine and Wise (1  994) doc- 
ument that this penalty alone cannot account for this  “excess” retirement at 
age sixty-five; nor can the incentives embedded in private pension plans or the 
availability of retirement health insurance through the Medicare program. This 
does not rule out a role for social security here; by setting up the “focal point” 
of a normal retirement age, the program may be the causal factor in explaining 
this spike. 
The second strand of this literature attempts specifically to model the role 
that potential social security benefits play in determining retirement. The gen- 
eral strategy followed by this literature is to use micro-data sets with informa- 
tion on potential  social security  benefit determinants  (earnings histories) or 
expost benefit levels to measure the incentives to retire across individuals in the 
data.I9 Then retirement models are estimated as a function of these incentive 
19. The data used are generally the Retirement History Survey (Boskin and Hurd 1978; Burtless 
1986; Burtless and Moffitt 1984; Hurd and Boskin 1984; Fields and Mitchell  1984; Blau 1994), 
although some authors have relied on the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men (Diamond 
and Hausman 1984). and recent work uses the Survey of Consumer Finances (Samwick 1993). 467  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
measures. While the exact modeling technique differs substantially across pa- 
pers,?O  the conclusions drawn are fairly similar: social security has large effects 
on retirement, but they are small relative to the trends over time documented 
in figures 11.1 and 1  1.2 above. For example, Burtless (1986) found that the 20 
percent benefit rise of the period 1969-72  raised the probability of retirement 
at age sixty-two and age sixty-five by  about  2  percentage  points. Over this 
period, however, the labor force participation of older men fell by over 6 per- 
cent,  and  social  security can  therefore  explain  only  about  one-third  of  the 
change. 
This literature  suffers  from two  important  limitations.  First,  the  key  re- 
gressor, social security benefits, is a nonlinear function of past earnings, and 
retirement propensities are clearly correlated with past earnings levels. This 
problem is common to the social insurance literature in the United States.:? 
But, for other social insurance programs, there is often variation along dimen- 
sions arguably exogenous to individual tastes, such as different legislative re- 
gimes across locations or within locations over time, that can be used to iden- 
tify  behavioral  models. There is no comparable variation in  social security, 
which is a nationally homogeneous program. Of course, this criticism does not 
necessarily imply that the estimates of this cross-sectional literature are flawed; 
as Hurd (1990) emphasizes, the nonlinearities in the social security benefits 
determination process are unlikely to be correlated with retirement propensit- 
ies. But there has been little serious effort to decompose the sources of varia- 
tion in social security benefits in an effort to assess whether the determinants 
that drive retirement behavior are plausibly excluded from a retirement equa- 
tion.23 
This criticism is levied most compellingly by  Krueger and Pischke (1992), 
who note that there is a unique “natural experiment” provided by the end of 
double-indexing for the “notch generation” that retired in the late  1970s and 
early 1980s. For this cohort, social security benefits were greatly reduced rela- 
tive to what they would have expected on the basis of the experience of the 
early to mid- 1970s. Yet the dramatic fall in labor force participation continued 
20. The earliest studies (Boskin and Hurd 1978; Fields and Mitchell 1984) used standard linear 
or nonlinear regression techniques. Later research (Burtless 1986; Burtless and Moffitt 1984) used 
nonlinear budget  constraint estimation to capture the richness  of  social security’s effects on the 
opportunity set. The most recent work (Diamond and Hausman  1984: Hausman and Wise 1985; 
Samwick 1993; Blau  1994) uses dynamic estimation of the retirement transition. 
21. One exception is Hurd and Boskin (1984). who claim that the large benefits increases of the 
period  1968-73 can explain all the change in labor force participation  in those years. 
22. For a careful discussion of this issue in the context of unemployment insurance, see Meyer 
(1989). 
23. At a minimum, one would want to include the level of lifetime earnings as a regressor, but 
most studies include only earnings in a recent year (it., Boskin and Hurd  1978; Burtless 1986). 
In  addition, even  using  a somewhat longer time frame for measuring  the earnings control (as 
Diamond and  Hausman  [I9841 do) does not  solve the problem; one could imagine that certain 
features of the lifetime pattern of earnings are correlated with both benefit levels and retirement 
decisions, such as the ratio of  earnings around age sixty-two to earnings at earlier ages (since 
individuals who have relatively high earnings at older ages may have better labor market opportu- 
nities around the age of retirement and therefore work longer). 468  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
unabated in this era. This raises important questions about the identification of 
this cross-sectional literature. 
The second problem with this literature is that it generally focuses on only 
one of the two key social security benefits variables, including social security 
benefits or wealth but ignoring the social security taxhbsidy rate documented 
above. In theory, as discussed above, both these factors plays an important role 
in determining retirement behavior. Studies that included this regressor found 
it to have a significant role in explaining retirement (Fields and Mitchell 1984; 
Samwick 1993); indeed, even in Krueger and Pischke’s (1992) paper, the ac- 
crual rate is often right signed and significant even as the wealth effect is insig- 
nificant. More recently, Stock and Wise (1990) noted that the correct regressor 
for considering both  social security and pension incentives for retirement is 
not the year-to-year accrual rate but the return to working this year relative to 
retiring at some future optimal date. 
Thus, to summarize, the past empirical evidence has produced mixed con- 
clusions as to the effect of social security policy on retirement. The abnormal 
spikes in retirement at the ages of early and normal retirement under social 
security suggest that the structure of the program plays a fundamental role in 
retirement timing  decisions. Within  this  framework, however, there  is only 
mixed evidence that changes in the overall generosity of the system have much 
effect on retirement behavior, although the evidence seems clearer for social 
security accrual rates than for social security wealth levels. 
Redistribution 
The other aspect of social security that has been emphasized by  previous 
work is redistribution.  Hurd and Shoven (1985), Boskin et al.  (1987), and, 
more recently, Steuerle and Bakija (1994) document empirically the redistribu- 
tion within and across generations that we discussed earlier. Table 11  B. 1 pre- 
sents a summary of the results from Stuerle and Bakija on redistribution across 
and within generations. Each figure is the expected lifetime net transfer from 
the social security system, which is total received postretirement minus taxes 
paid during the working life. These net transfers are calculated for four demo- 
graphic groups, for three levels of lifetime earnings, for three dates of retire- 
ment.  In the  first three  columns, the  expected values use average mortality 
assumptions; in the last two columns, the authors allow mortality to be income 
related, accounting for longer lives for higher-income individuals. All figures 
are in thousands of  1993 dollars. 
A number of interesting findings emerge from table llB.l. First, there is a 
secular decline in the net transfers from the social security system for newer 
cohorts; net transfers are positive for all groups retiring in 1960 but negative 
for most groups for those retiring  in 2030. Second, the system transfers re- 
sources differentially to females relative to males since the tax structure is the 
same but females live longer. Third, the system transfers resources dispropor- 
tionately to couples through spousal and survivor benefits and even more so to 469  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
Table llB.l  Redistribution  through the Social Security System (figures  are net 
transfers in thousands of 1993 dollars) 
Wage 
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Source: Steuerle and Bakija (1994). 
single-earner couples since no taxes are paid by the spouse but he or she gets 
benefits. Fourth, despite its ostensibly redistributional structure, the system tra- 
ditionally transferred more resources toward higher-income  earners than to- 
ward lower-income earners; this is largely because social security was a good 
investment and the higher-income earners were more heavily invested. But, by 
1995, and even more so by 2030, net transfers are progressive for average mor- 
tality prospects. Finally, introducing differential mortality prospects somewhat 
offsets this progressivity. 
Appendix C 
In this appendix, we provide the formulas for our computation of social secu- 
rity wealth. 
Notation 
AM  = worker’s age; 




= year of worker’s birth; 
= year of spouse’s birth; 
= month of worker’s birth; 470  Peter Diamond and Jonathan Gruber 
maxage 
P  = discount rate; 
t 
= maximum potential age that we consider for both worker and 
spouse; 
= number of months after attaining age sixty-two that the worker de- 
cides to wait before first claiming benefits; 
= number of months after t that the worker decides to continue working 
just below the earnings test limit (so that he is still eligible for full 
benefits despite continued work); 
age, decides to wait until starting to claim benefits; 
aged less than her normal retirement age, and whose partner died k 
months after attaining age sixty-two, decides to wait before claiming 
her survivor benefits; 
rn 
S  = number of months that a spouse, aged less than normal retirement 
{“k}r  = 1 . . . ,  12 X (maxage -  AM) = number of months that a widow 
Bx  = amount of benefits that the worker is entitled to in month x; 
D,  = amount of benefits that the spouse is entitled to claim in month x  on 
c,  = amount of benefits that the surviving spouse is entitled to claim in 
Ex  = amount of benefits that the surviving spouse is entitled to claim in 
0:  = dummy variable, which is one if  12 X AF + k 2 12 X 60 + s and 
0:  = dummy variable, which is one if  12 X AF + k 2  12 X 60 + sk and 
p,(.IYM,  sex) = cohort- and sex-specific conditional probability measure expressing 
the basis of the worker’s earnings history; 
month x  in case the worker dies (before retiring) in month x; 
month x  in case the worker dies (after retiring) in month x; 
zero otherwise; 
zero otherwise; 
the probability that the worker is still alive in month x, conditional 
on being alive in month x -  1 (by definition, p,2x62  = I); 
the probability that the spouse is still alive in month x, conditional on 
being alive in month x -  1 (by definition, plZxAF  = 1); 




i,  I, j,  k 
The construct of  interest for our analysis is the net present discounted value 
(NPDV) of social security benefits. This is the sum of four components: 
= [12 X (YM + AM -  1) + a + 4/12; 
= increase in benefits in December of year x; 
= contributions to social security system in month x; and 
= simple counting variables 
V  = [12 X (YM + AM -  1) + a + k]/12; 
PB  = NPDV of  worker’s benefits; 
SpB  = NPDV of spousal benefits; 
SUB = NPDV of survivor benefits; and 
SSC = NPDV of social security contributions. 471  Social Security and Retirement in the United States 
The net present discounted  value of social security benefits (NPDVSSC) is 
thus 
NPDVSSC = PB  + SpB + SUB + SSC. 
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